The link between institutional and market failures, rural poverty and environmental degradation suggests a 'win-win'policy intervention: relax local 'constraints'and achieve poverty alleviation and environmental goals. We evaluate the ability of the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) in China, a reforestation payments programme, to relax constraints on o¤-farm labour markets and achieve these dual objectives. Our model of the agricultural household allows for heterogeneous exposure to constraints and predicts, inter alia, that the impact of the SLCP on o¤-farm labour supply will be larger for constrained households if constraints are relaxed. To test the predictions we combine a switching regression with 'di¤erence in di¤erences'. Applied to panel data, this technique allows identi…cation of the heterogeneous impact of the SLCP on constrained and unconstrained households. Our results identify some support for the 'win-win'hypothesis in the case of the SLCP, but also how the targeting of the programme can be improved.
Introduction
An expansive theoretical and empirical literature on household behaviour in developing countries points to near ubiquity of missing markets, imperfect institutions and high transactions costs faced by rural households (Jacoby 1993; Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry 2000; . As a result, rural households are constrained in their choice of production patterns and occupations and are precluded from many income enhancing opportunities. This economic environment conspires to limit development and even trap households in poverty (e.g. Banerjee and Newman 1994; Taylor and Adelman 2003; de Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu 2005; Dumas 2007) .
At the same time, these localised failures are frequently the root cause of wider environmental externalities. For instance, failures in the o¤-farm labour market have been shown to underpin slash-and-burn agriculture, deforestation and other apparently ine¢ cient land-use practices in many developing countries (Blu¤stone 1995; Shively and Pagiola 2004) . Likewise, externalities at the river-basin level, such as increased ‡ooding, often arise as a direct consequence of ine¢ cient labour and land allocations (e.g. FAO 2005) . Thus, developing countries can be doubly immiserated since, not only do these failures leave rural households impoverished by limiting opportunities for income generation, but the coping strategies that households employ frequently can impose externalities upon the wider population.
It is di¢ cult to imagine a silver lining to this cloud, and yet a closer examination of this account suggests some grounds for optimism. Since the cause of poverty lies in ine¢ cient land and labour allocations due to the presence of institutional and market constraints, a 'win -win'intervention immediately presents itself: by relaxing constraints both poverty and negative externalities can be reduced. Of course, this realisation is not new, and numerous interventions in developing countries have been motivated in this way (e.g. Baland and Platteau 1996, 290; Carter and Olinto 2003) 1 . However, ensuring local interventions are successful is not without its di¢ culties. Among these, the heterogeneity of rural households'exposure to constraints presents a particularly important stumbling block, meaning that the impact of local interventions will also tend to be heterogeneous (Carter and Yao 2002; Vakis et al. 2005) . Combined with the fact that exposure to constraints is frequently unobserved, both the design and targeting of interventions, as well as predicting household responses and undertaking retrospective evaluations, are made considerably more complicated 2 . This paper focuses on understanding the mechanisms by which policy interventions can secure such 'win-win'outcomes for poverty and environment by relaxing the constraints that underpin locally ine¢ cient land and labour allocations. We argue that in many rural contexts in the developing world, such an analysis is best served by …rst focusing on one particular household economic decision, namely that of o¤ farm labour supply and on understanding how this particular decision is a¤ected by di¤erent constraints. Once this is established, we then argue that investigating the impact of a potential win-win policy intervention would require explicitly taking into account the heterogeneous nature and impact of these constraints. To …x our analysis, we have chosen rural China and the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) as an instructive setting to draw wider policy conclusions. We develop a theoretical framework that allows to derive testable hypothesis on the heterogeneous impact of the programme. Then to test the hypothesis we develop a novel econometric approach that combines a switching regression with a di¤erence in di¤erences framework. The empirical strategy is implemented using household and village level data collected in the Chinese provinces of Guizhou and Ningxia.
Our analysis focuses on China for three reasons. Firstly, China is especially prone to diverse market and institutional failures given its historically centralized economy and currently only nascent markets in rural areas (de Brauw et al., 2002) . In particular, land use and exchange rights restrictions and tenure insecurity have served to limit participation in the o¤-farm labour market (Carter and Yao 2002) , which itself has been shown to be highly segmented and discriminatory against rural migrants Song 1999, 2005) . These failures result in rationing of o¤-farm labour for rural households (Knight and Song 2005) , with adverse consequences on rural incomes 3 . Secondly, the presence of institutional and market failures has induced environmental degradation in China via ine¢ cient land and labour allocations, e.g. high land-labour ratios (Wang, Han and Bennett 2005) and low levels of agricultural and land saving investments (Jacoby Li and Rozelle 2001) . In particular, Jin (2002, 2003) point to failures in the market for land as the cause of ine¢ cient agricultural practices in a number of provinces of China, while Feng et al (2004) highlight limited o¤-farm opportunities and grain shortages as the main motivation for the cultivation of marginal, highly sloped lands. In turn, these household responses have been identi…ed as major causes of large scale environmental degradation and externalities at the level of the river-basin. For instance, it is widely thought that cultivation of previously forested sloping lands in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River induced the serious ‡ooding and loss of life along the Yangtze River in the summer of 1998 (Yin and Li 2001) .
Lastly, in response to this environmental degradation, the Chinese government has implemented a major intervention. The Sloping Lands Conversion programme (SLCP) of 1999 provides compensation to households for reforesting cultivated sloped land in the upper reaches of the major river basins. The stated aims of the SLCP are twofold, and speak to the notion of a 'win win' solution (Xu et al. 2004) : to curb land degradation and its consequences while at the same time reducing rural poverty.
The programme is by far the most ambitious and largest of its kind in the developing world. Yet, the compensation, which constitutes the main policy instrument, is temporary. Hence, the precise mechanism by which the SLCP is to achieve its dual objectives in the long-term is open to question. Following the argument above, the success of the SLCP rests upon its ability to address the local market and institutional failures that lie at the root of ine¢ cient choices. Beyond immediate reallocation, long-term success requires that additional dynamic mechanisms are at play which remove constraints permanently, even after compensation ceases. For example, one could imagine that the SLCP acts as a push factor, pushing participants from a 'bad'equilibrium to a 'good'equilibrium where households are no longer subject to any constraints on their optimizing behaviour (Murphy, et al. 1989; Dumas 2007) 4 . Through this lens, failure to relax the pivotal constraints will mean that households will be inclined to revert back to former practices when compensation ceases.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine whether the SLCP can achieve its dual objectives via the relaxation of the constraints that bind on the o¤-farm labour decisions of participating households. We argue that once these constraints are relaxed, households are induced to supply more labour, thereby increasing household income and alleviating pressures to cultivate marginal sloped land. In addition to the well established link between o¤-farm labour opportunities and deforestation outlined above, our focus on o¤-farm labour decisions is motivated by two further observations. Firstly, the evidence suggests that o¤-farm opportunities o¤er the greatest potential for increasing rural household income (Kung and Lee 2001; Benjamin et al. 2005; Knight and Song 2005) . 5 . Secondly, previous analyses have shown that o¤-farm incomes represent the predominant substitute for crop incomes for participants in the SLCP (Xu et al. 2004; Groom 2005) 6 . Our investigation of the ability of the SLCP to relax constraints relating to the o¤-farm labour market contributes more broadly to the literature on policy evaluation in developing countries by developing a theoretical and empirical approach which accommodates the aforementioned household heterogeneity. Firstly, we develop a model of the household consumer-producer in the presence of market and institutional failures, which distinguishes household types according to the nature of the constraints they face. Several testable hypotheses emerge from the model concerning the impact of the SLCP upon these distinct households. In particular, if the SLCP relaxes certain constraints, its impact will be larger for 'o¤-farm constrained'than for unconstrained households. We then develop a novel empirical approach, combining a switching regression with unobserved sample separation with 'di¤erence-in-di¤erences'. The …rst feature allows identi…cation of constrained and unconstrained households, which is assumed unobservable a priori (Carter and Yao 2002; Vakis et al. 2005) . The second feature accounts for selection into the SLCP in the identi…cation of the treatment e¤ect 7 . Finally, using household panel data from Guizhou and Ningxia provinces we test the predictions of the theoretical model and …nd that the impact of the SLCP on 4 For example if risk averse households were not exploiting earning di¤erentials between on and o¤-farm employment due to the uncertainty in the o¤-farm labour market but, once pushed to do so by the SLCP restrictions on land use, do not …nd the return journey pro…table. Also, on-the-job returns and network e¤ects could contribute to make recultivation unpro…table once the SLCP ends. 5 The remarkable reduction of poverty in China over the last two decades was largely achieved through increases in rural incomes, of which o¤-farm income has become an increasingly important component in recent years (Yao 2000; Park, Wang and Wu 2002; Bowlus and Sicular 2003; Xu et al. 2004) . Poverty (less than $1 per day or RMB900 in PPP terms) fell from 76% to 13% during this period (Chen and Ravallion 2005) . Another causal factor, it is argued, was the introduction of the Household Responsibility System in 1980, which dismantled communes and granted long-term leases over land (Dong 1996; Liu, Carter and Yao 1998) . 6 We remain silent on the environmental outcome of reforestation per se, an issue that has received considerable attention in its own right (FAO 2005) , and assume that reforestation reduces degradation. 7 The so-called 'program evaluation problem'. See Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) and Abadie (2005) for a discussion.
household o¤-farm labour supply is only positive for certain 'constrained'households. We are also able to reveal the nature of household constraints and discuss the e¤ectiveness of the SLCP to act upon them.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the SLCP while Section 3 presents the household model and the hypotheses regarding the impact of the SLCP. In Section 4 the empirical approach and data are described. The results are shown in Section 5 while Section 6 discusses the wider policy implications from the impact of relaxing constraints on achieving win-win poverty and environment policy objectives.
2 The Sloping Lands Conversion programme (SLCP)
Objectives and implementation
The SLCP is an ambitious intervention to encourage reforestation of previously converted land by compensating farmers for changes in land use practices on sloping and other types of land. The proposed scale of the project is very large, the aim being the conversion of around 15 million hectares of cropland, approximately a third of which will be on land which has a slope of at least 25 degrees (Xu and Cao 2002) 8 . The principle motivation for this intervention was to address the environmental degradation associated with the deforestation and cultivation of highly sloped lands in the upper reaches of the major river basins . The basin level externalities have included the severe ‡ooding in the Yangtze river basins in 1998 and drought in the lower reaches of the Yellow River. Furthermore, in both upstream and downstream areas the loss of fertile topsoil, the siltation of streams and reduced hydraulic capacity of the watercourses have inhibited the productivity of agriculture, the availability of water resources and contributed to increased incidents of ‡ooding. Consequently, highly sloped lands have been the main focus of the SLCP 9 . The main instrument of the SLCP is the direct compensation of farmers. Compensation is received in a number of di¤erent forms, levels and durations. Firstly, compensation can consist of cash, grain or seedlings for trees provided by the local forest agencies. Depending upon particular circumstances, SLCP participants receive approximately 100 to 150 kilograms of grain per mu per year and an additional Y300 per mu per year in cash 10 . Secondly, compensation varies from region to region re ‡ecting local conditions. In the Guizhou and Ningxia, the regions studied in this paper, the level of the annual cash compensation was Y300 and Y200 per hectare respectively, re ‡ecting distinct opportunity costs of land in each region. Importantly, the SLCP has tended to over-compensate participants (Xu and Cao 8 Since the policy commenced in 1999, approximately 15 million farmers have become participants in 20 provinces and over 27000 villages (Uchida et al. 2005 ). In the …rst 2 years of the SLCP almost 1.2 million hectares of cultivated land was converted to forestland or pasture, while an additional 1 million hectares of barren land was a¤orested. 9 The environmental costs of cultivation are not limited to watersheds but also include airsheds. The increased incidence of dust-storms in the Northern plains, and the associated loss of topsoil, has also been attributed to the extensive cultivation of former pastures or natural grasslands and, despite its name, the SLCP has targeted these ‡atter areas with the purpose of returning the land to its natural grassland state (Xu and Cao 2002) . 10 1 hectare = 15 mu.
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). Finally, compensation varies in its duration depending on whether sloped land is converted to 'ecological'forest (8 years) or to 'productive'forest (5 years) 11 . The rules of the SLCP state that a minimum of 80% of the reforested area in any region must be ecological forest and in our study area the rate is almost 95% 12 .
Selection into the SLCP
Participation in the SLCP is in principle voluntary from the perspective of the farmers. However, the SLCP is implemented by local governments and local SLCP implementation agencies which gauge households' suitability. Furthermore, many commentators have suggested that participation is frequently involuntary (Xu and Cao 2002; Uchida et al. 2005) . In previous studies it remains unclear whether participation is voluntary or compulsory. Our interviews with village leaders show that selection of participants takes on two distinct types in the study areas: either participation is compulsory or households can volunteer for selection, that is, the implementing agency chooses participants from a self selected pool. In our sample, implementation was split 60:40 between these two types. Given this, regardless of which agent eventually selects participants in the SLCP, selection into the programme is unlikely to be random. This gives rise to some empirical issues which are discussed in Section 4.
Theoretical model of household responses to the SLCP
In the introduction we have argued that the mechanism by which the SLCP can achieve its stated goals is by relaxing the binding constraints which induce households towards ine¢ cient labour allocation choices and induce the cultivation of marginal, highly sloped lands. In order to describe this mechanism we present a farm household consumer-producer model in the presence of institutional constraints and market failure. The model shows how heterogeneous groups of households can be distinguished, according to the severity of the constraints they face. This allows us to develop hypotheses with regard to the impact of the SLCP upon these distinct types of households.
Basic Model
Let us consider a farm household whose preferences are de…ned over income, y; leisure time l l ; and a vector of consumption shifters z c : The household is endowed with a total amount of time T which is allocated between leisure l l , on farm work l i and o¤-farm work l o ; which is remunerated at a wage w o : The farm household is endowed with land, which is assumed to be distributed in parcels of an increasing productivity 2 0 ; : Agricultural output is produced with a technology:
11 With 'ecological'forest farmers have no rights to forest products. For 'productive'forests participants have rights to collect non-timber forest products (e.g. fruits, nuts mushrooms and limited quantities of timber) hence compensation lasts for a shorter period of up to 5 years (Xu and Cao 2002) .
12 Ng and Pearce (2005) note the tension between encouraging more commercial or productive forests at the expense of environmental bene…ts, and encouraging more ecological forests to the potential detriment of incomes and hence the long-run sustainability of the programme. q(l i ; ), where ( ) represents the amount of land under cultivation. That is, households cultivate their highest productivity lands until land of productivity ; which is a decision variable. We make usual assumptions on the production technology: q 1 (:) > 0; q 2 (:) > 0; q 11 (:) < 0; q 22 (:) < 0 13 . Furthermore, we assume labour and land are complements: q 12 (:) > 0 14 . Households can sell some of their production on agricultural markets, at a price p: However, there is evidence of large imperfections in the agricultural markets in China. Park et al. (2002) …nd that during the reform period between 1988 and 1995, grain markets have not substantially developed as a result of an erratic reform path, with several retrenchments from the liberalisation policy 15 , but also because of transaction costs and notably infrastructure bottlenecks. In interior provinces in particular, market deepening has lagged and autarky rates have actually increased over the period. Burgess (2001) describes how Chinese rural households respond to these adverse market conditions by relying on own production to meet their food requirement 16 . The presence of quotas and agricultural taxes 17 , which have to be paid in kind also impose agricultural production requirements 18 . In addition, uncultivated land faces a high risk of being con…scated and redistributed by the village authorities, a practice known as the 'use it or lose it'rule (Deininger and Jin 2002; Ping 2003) 19 . Uncultivated land is easily observable to village authorities and other households who may have interest in denouncing perpetrators so as to bene…t from land redistribution. This con…scation risk induces households to display that land is useful and potentially produce more than optimal levels of output. In combination, imperfections in agricultural markets, taxes in kind and land con…scation risk imply that households must meet a minimum level of production. This translates into the following 'farm output constraint': q(l i ; ) C: In addition, the fact that land rental markets are non-existent or poorly developed (Carter and Yao 2002; Bowlus and Sicular 2003) , suggests that households can only cultivate land allocated to them by local government or village leaders 20 . This translates into the following 'land constraint':
0 : With utility represented by the twice di¤erentiable, concave function: U (y; l l ; z c ), with 13 Where:
; and q 22 (:) =
The reason for this assumption, as well as an empirical justi…cation, are made in later sections of the paper. 15 The government continued to intervene strongly in grain markets, namely in periods of sharp grain price in ‡ation in 1988-1999 and 1994-1995. Despite the presence of some private grain traders, state-owned grain enterprises (SOEs) have dominated the market at least until 2004, when new regulations on grain circulation have been adopted by the state council (China Daily, Xinhua, 2004-06-08) .
16 describes how some households may opt out of the market and remain in autarky in presence of a wedge between buying and selling prices driven by transaction costs. 17 The plan for most agricultural taxes is that from 2006 is for incremental reductions. They were still in force at the time of our survey however.
18 Only few villages allow for cash payments (Brandt, Rozelle and Turner 2004) . 19 Indeed, although land readjustments have been either circumscribed or completely prohibited by the 1999 revised Land Management Law for a 30 year period, legal provisions have not always translated into e¤ective tenure security. 20 Again, this is re ‡ected in our data in which only 12% of households rent land in or out. Only 7% of all cultivated land is involved in such transfers. Furthermore, the majority of such rental exchanges is informal and generally does not give rise to any monetary compensation (Bowlus and Sicular 2003). grain production the numeraire (p = 1), hence y = q(l i ; ; z q ) + w o l o , and l l = T l i l o , the household maximization problem can be represented as follows:
where c and are the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraints (2) and (3) respectively.
We consider only households who work both on-and o¤-farm. Appendix A shows how households'behaviour in the o¤-farm labour market di¤ers according to whether constraints are binding on their optimizing behaviour. When no constraint is binding on household behaviour, or when only the land constraint is binding, households' production and consumption choices are separable (see . Such households are labeled hereafter 'o¤-farm unconstrained'households. They equalize the returns of on-and o¤-farm labour, and cultivate land until the marginal productivity of labour on that land meets the o¤-farm wage. Their decision wage in the o¤-farm labour market is the market wage.
On the contrary, it is straightforward that households for whom the farm output constraint is binding also face a binding land constraint, that is, they use all available land. Such households are labelled hereafter 'o¤-farm constrained'households. The decision price in the o¤-farm labour market is no longer the market wage, but a shadow wage, which depends on the farm output constraint and which is lower than the o¤-farm market wage. The marginal productivity of on-farm labour of such households is lower than the o¤-farm market wage and leads to excessive labour allocated on-farm compared to the optimal situation 21 . Surplus on-farm labour is characteristic of rural China (Knight and Song 2005) . Appendix A presents reduced form equations of the o¤-farm labour supply of these di¤erent groups of households. The important distinction between the 'o¤-farm constrained and 'unconstrained'group is that, due to the idiosyncratic shadow decision wage, o¤-farm labour supply of constrained households is impacted by the presence of the output constraint, while it only depends on production characteristics and households preferences for unconstrained households.
The determinants of o¤-farm labour supply di¤er depending upon which group a household belongs to. As will be explained in Section 4 below, this provides the basis for the empirical identi…cation of these heterogeneous groups of households. Further, the impact of the SLCP will be heterogeneous across households, depending upon their exposure to constraints. We now focus on the impact of the policy.
The Impact of the SLCP
Our model allows us to illustrate that participation in the SLCP has two likely e¤ects. Firstly, restrictions are imposed on land use, as the SLCP targets highly sloped lands of the lowest productivity, which were previously cultivated. The programme imposes =~ ; with~ > 0 22 . The land constraint (3) is tightened as a result. Secondly, the programme provides subsidies, which are largely distributed in grain, in order to compensate from the lost production on converted land. Let A be the unit subsidy distributed for every piece of land set aside. The total subsidy is thus: A(~ 0 ): Where over compensation occurs, grain subsidies act to relax the 'output'constraint (2) for those households that are o¤-farm constrained 23 . The household's optimization problem can now be represented as follows:
s.t.
On the basis of 6-7, we obtain the following proposition on the impact of the programme on household o¤-farm labour supply:
Proposition 1 (a) The SLCP generates a positive substitution e¤ect from on-farm to o¤-farm labour by reducing the amount of cultivated land.
(b) The revenue e¤ect of the SLCP subsidies on the o¤-farm labour supply is either negative, nil, or positive, according to whether households are over, exactly, or under compensated for their loss in agricultural production, respectively.
(c) In addition to the substitution and revenue e¤ects, the SLCP grain subsidies relax the 'output constraint', which increases the o¤-farm labour supply of 'o¤-farm constrained' households.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 1(a) lies in that participation in the SLCP reduces cultivated land and hence, as labour and land are complements in the agricultural production function, 22 It is assumed that at this stage, once the household has been chosen to participate in the program, the amount of land enrolled is not a decision variable for the household. In addition, we assume that~ >^ implying that the programme is supposed to target only land which was previously cultivated, and this is observable so that~ >^ is enforceable. This is a plausible assumption given that in our sample all land is used in cultivation. 23 As described above, the SLCP tends to over-compensate participants.
participation in the SLCP induces a positive substitution e¤ect from on-farm labour to o¤-farm labour 24 . Proposition 1(b) is established from the fact that, if the subsidies exactly compensate households for their loss of agricultural income, leisure does not vary, and the revenue e¤ect is nil. Conversely, if households are over (under) compensated, there is a positive (negative) revenue e¤ect and leisure will increase (decrease) assuming normality. This describes the revenue e¤ect of the SLCP which is dominated by the substitution e¤ect if the marginal subsidy, A; is lower than the (real) marginal productivity of land under cultivation 25 . Proposition 1(c) captures the heterogeneity in household responses to the SLCP. In addition to the substitution and revenue e¤ects, relaxing the 'output constraint' via SLCP subsidies makes the decision wage of constrained households converge towards the market wage as c ; the shadow price of the production constraint, decreases. The SLCP subsidies induce an upward shift in constrained households'shadow o¤-farm wage, which in turn generates an increase in their o¤-farm labour supply. When SLCP participants are completely released from their production constraint, their decision wage becomes the market wage. In sum, the impact of the SLCP on o¤-farm constrained households will di¤er from that on o¤-farm unconstrained households in one important dimension: the relaxation of the 'output constraint'.
Econometric Approach
The model presented in Section 3.1. together with Proposition 1 (a) -(c) point to a number of distinct hypotheses for those households that participate in the o¤-farm labour market 26 . In particular from Section 3.1., we obtain our …rst hypothesis, which states that:
Hypothesis 1: The o¤-farm labour supply of unconstrained households depends only on production side characteristics and on the household's preferences, while that of the constrained households depends also on the presence of the 'farm output constraint'.
Proposition 1 (a) to (c) imply the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: If the revenue e¤ect does not o¤set the substitution e¤ect, participation in the programme should induce an increase in the o¤-farm labour supply of all households.
Hypothesis 3: The increase in o¤-farm labour supply should be larger for o¤-farm constrained than for o¤-farm unconstrained households. 24 Given that this assumption is pivotal to the predictions we make in the following sections, we have estimated the agricultural production function using a multi-output distance function approach (Battese and Coelli, 1992) . We estimated a Trans-log production function in the two main outputs (wheat and potatoes) in land, household labour and fertilizer. The cross partial of land and labour was positive (0.12) and signi…cant at the 5% level. 25 Indeed, the implicit function theorem yields:
Hypothesis 4: Participation in the SLCP reduces the probability of being o¤-farm constrained, since participation in the SLCP may fully relax the production constraint, so that households which were formerly 'o¤-farm constrained'households become 'o¤-farm unconstrained'.
In exploring these hypotheses, the empirical analysis must overcome two important challenges. Firstly, it must accommodate the heterogeneous households identi…ed by the theoretical model: the o¤-farm constrained and unconstrained. This is particularly di¢ cult since the constraints faced by rural households are not only numerous but also predominantly unobservable (Vakis et al. 2005) . Secondly, in evaluating the impact of any programme using non-experimental data, the problem of selection bias must be addressed 27 . We propose a novel solution to these two empirical issues which combines a switching regression with unobserved sample separation with di¤erence in di¤erences (DID). Firstly, the switching regression model accommodates heterogeneity among households by separating the sample and de…ning two distinct regimes. This approach is consistent with our theoretical model, which points to the existence of two distinct regimes in the analysis of o¤-farm labour supply: constrained and unconstrained. Since separation is unobserved and these regimes cannot be de…ned a priori, the identi…cation and interpretation of the regimes is drawn from analysis of the coe¢ cients of the regime regressions and by reference to the theoretical model. That is, constrained households can be identi…ed by the statistical signi…cance of constraint variables in the labour supply equation. This constitutes a test of hypothesis 1.
Secondly, the presence of panel data allows us to control for selection into the SLCP using di¤erence in di¤erences (DID) (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Abadie, 2005) . Combining DID with the switching regression model makes it possible to identify the 'treatment e¤ect' of the SLCP on each regime and hence test whether this e¤ect is heterogeneous. In this way we can test hypotheses 2 and 3. As explained in the following section, our empirical approach also yields a direct test of hypothesis 4.
Di¤erence in Di¤erences (DID)
We use DID to estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) of participation in the SLCP on o¤-farm labour supply. Under suitable assumptions DID controls for endogeneity of the participation decision and consequently provides a consistent estimate of the ATE (Heckman et al., 1997) . We present this approach within a general framework which draws from Chamberlain (1982) 28 . We specify a reduced form labour supply function as a components of variance model. For each household i (i = 1; ::; N ) labour supply at time t (t = 1; ::; T ); l it ; is modelled as a linear function of K 1 household and village level characteristics (X it and Z it respectively), and unobservable components of variance: i ; t and u it . The latter represent permanent household speci…c, time speci…c and individual transitory e¤ects respectively, and we make 27 The program evaluation literature is replete with discussion of this particular issue. See in particular Heckman et al. (1997) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000) and for comprehensive discussions.
28 Abadie (2005, p2-5) provides a succinct explanation of the DID method which e¤ectively draws on Chamberlain (1982).
the usual assumptions about them 29 . Finally, the dependence of labour supply on participation in the SLCP is captured by the dummy variable D it ; and the scalar represents the ATT of the SLCP on the outcome variable l it :
where x it = [X it ; Z it ] is a (K 1)xN T matrix and 0 is a 1x(K 1) vector of parameters. For simplicity of exposition, the treatment e¤ect in this model ( ) is assumed identical for all households. This assumption can easily be relaxed by including interactions with D it . To account for endogeneity and obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of this model we follow Chamberlain (1982) and recast (10) in terms of a T variate regression for a household i. The method employed is described in Appendix B and yields the following model of Di¤erence in Di¤erences:
From this ; as well as the parameters in and t ; can be consistently estimated using OLS. We use this approach to identify , and the coe¢ cients on interactions with D it and the time varying explanatory variables we expect to be correlated with i 30 . One assumption underpinning DID is the equality of the trend in the error terms over time between treatment and control groups (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2002) . One bene…t of the approach used here is that time varying parameters are estimated, which capture some of the variation over time that would usually appear in the error terms.
Switching regression using DID
As discussed above, households face idiosyncratic institutional and market failures. Consequently, it would be unusual for all households to be constrained in any given region and, if they are, for all constraints to be equally important for every household. In addition to this, the cause of constraints is not always observable (Carter and Yao 2002; Vakis et al. 2005) . In this setting, and given the theoretical model of Section 3 the econometric model of labour supply decisions accommodates the following features: (i) a reduced form approach; (ii) the source of separability is not con…ned to a single market failure; (iii) recognition of heterogeneity across households with respect to the nature and extent of constraints; (iv) unknown sample separation between constrained and unconstrained households. These features of the problem point to a switching regression with unobserved sample separation as the most suitable econometric framework (Hartley 1978) .
The model belongs to the family of mixture-distribution models that aim to 'unmix' the sample by simultaneously identifying the stochastic structures governing the separation 29 These are (Hsiao, 1986) 
of the sample into two latent regimes while explaining the behavioural decisions of each observation in the regimes (Maddala 1983; Hartley 1978) . However, what distinguishes our approach from previous applications (e.g. Vakis et al., 2005) is that the regime regression equations are of the form shown in equation (11). This innovation means that not only are points (i)-(iv) above accommodated, but we can also account for endogeneity of the variables of interest by exploiting the panel nature of the data. In particular, under the assumptions of the DID model, we can consistently estimate treatment e¤ects in each equation of the switching regression. The model uses the following system of equations to de…ne household behaviour:
where j = 1; 2: l j it represents the latent o¤-farm labour supply of two heterogenous groups or regimes of households and it is a latent variable that determines sample separation. The error terms are assumed to be normal i.i.d disturbances with zero means and variance 2 j (j = 1; 2) with 2 = 1 for identi…cation. For each household i in each time period t we only have data on the observable counterpart of l j it such that:
Given that we cannot observe the regime classi…cation, each randomly selected household i will have a probability 1 = x it of belonging to the …rst regime and probability of belonging to the second 31 . The probability density function of each observation is hence given by the mixture of two distributions 32 . The resulting likelihood function is maximised with respect to the parameters using the E-M method as articulated by Hartley (1978) .
To interpret the empirically de…ned regimes we refer to the theoretical model. Equations (26) and (32) in Appendix A show: x it = p; w o ; ; k ; T; z q ; z c ; where ( k 2 ( 0 ;^ )) for the 'o¤-farm unconstrained'households, and according to (40): x it = p; w o ; C; T; ; 0 ; z q ; z c for the 'o¤-farm constrained'households. The di¤erence between these groups is the presence of the constraint variables, C; in the latter. The constrained regime could then be identi…ed if the variables associated with the production constraint are signi…cant in one regime and not the other. This would be an indication that our sample represents observations drawn from two distinct samples and would be a test of hypothesis 1. One feature common to each equation is the average treatment e¤ect, j and : If there is support for hypothesis 1 then hypotheses 2 and 3 can be tested by inspection of the estimates of 1 and 2 , while hypothesis 4 can be tested by inspection of the estimate of in the switching equation, 31 We use a general notation for exposition, where the superscripts de…ne the relevant equation of the switching regression.
32 Labelling these distributions ' 1 and ' 2 ; and using general notation for the explanatory variables and parameters, the distribution function will have the form: f l
and the likelihood function will be:
which also yields information about what determines whether a household is in one regime or another. In order to identify the parameters of interest in this model it is assumed that the error terms are independent across equations 33 . This assumption means that the disturbance term in (13), which a¤ects the probability of falling into the …rst regime, is independent of that a¤ecting the continuous labour supply decision 34 .
Data
The data set contains information on 286 households in Ningxia (155) and Guizhou (131) 35 . In tandem with the household surveys 40 village questionnaires were undertaken in order to obtain village level data. Data for the pre-and post-programme periods were collected where the pre-programme data was retrospective and referred to 1999 for both participants and non-participants 36 . Table B1 in Appendix C presents descriptive statistics of the variables included in the switching regression. We follow previous work in this area (e.g. Vakis et al. 2005 ) and estimate the model on a sub-sample of the data including only those households that supply o¤-farm labour both pre-and post-programme 37 . This reduces the number of households to 159, 30% of which are non-participants in the SLCP.
Explanatory Variables
Section 3.1. discussed the likely sources of constraints on household behaviour. Two main factors of constraints have been identi…ed in the literature: the incompleteness of local labour and agricultural markets, and institutional constraints (Burgess 2001; Carter and Yao 2002; Bowlus and Sicular 2003) . Our theoretical model suggests that household size and composition will in ‡uence o¤-farm labour supply, not only through the labour endowment e¤ect, but also through its in ‡uence on the quantity of labour that needs to be allocated to cultivation in order to meet quotas and family food requirements in the context of imperfect agricultural markets (Burgess 2001) . The presence of young children and pensioners, who do not contribute to the labour endowment but represent extra mouths to feed, are included 33 Since we do not observe l = l 1 and l = l 2 simultaneously the following variance covariance structure applies (Hartley 1978 This assumption is an integral part of the switching regression model with unobserved sample separation of Hartley (1978) . The assumption is routinely employed in the applied labour economics literature (e,g, Vakis et al., 2005; Roig, 1999; Dickens and Lang, 1985) . 35 The SLCP survey was administered by moderators from Beijing University. The survey was part of broader research project that was completed in October 2006. 36 The data was collected in 2004 and hence the responses to questions concerning the pre-SLCP base period (i.e. 1999) could be prone to recall bias. We attempted to minimise the recall bias by careful survey design and by training our enumerators to use speci…c queues suggested by the literature (Hakim 2000) in order to assist respondents to more accurately recollect levels for past amounts and activities. Furthermore, the econometric analysis presented in this paper (Tables 1 and 2 ) employs variables that are by nature less prone to recall bias (such as education level and household composition variables). 37 Consequently, we do not deal with censored data. Groom et al. (2006) analyse the discrete decision and …nd that the SLCP induces increased participation in the o¤-farm labour market.
in the analysis to capture the latter e¤ects. As an indicator of transaction costs we use distance to a main road to capture the ease of access to agricultural and labour markets. Institutional constraints are captured by the development of land rentals within the village (Deininger and Minten 1999) and by the distance from the village to the nearest credit agency (Key et al. 2000) , while the level of tenure security is proxied by soil quality at the village level. Soil quality is found to be highly correlated with tenure security in the literature. Frequently this is because the disincentive e¤ect of land reallocations on farmers' investment incentives results in land degradation (Jacoby et al. 2001; Brandt, Rozelle and Turner 2004) . Unfortunately, the approach described in Section 4.1 fails to deal with the endogeneity problem inherent in household level institutional constraints, since these data are time invariant 38 . Consequently, we follow Carter and Yao (2002) and Deininger and Minten (1999) and include village level variables to proxy for such institutional constraints and mitigate the endogeneity problem that arises from using household level variables.
Although the estimation of o¤-farm labour supply requires reasonably complete and accurate data on wages, we were unable to obtain such reliable information, for three main reasons. Firstly, we observe a very low variability of o¤-farm wages between the two periods of observations, which may indicate that people are mis-reporting wages. Secondly, employment in Township and Villages Enterprises (TVEs) provides signi…cant in kind payments, so that the comparison of self-employed earnings with TVEs'wages may hide signi…cant di¤erences. Thirdly, our analysis is complicated by a large number of households who do not provide any information on wages. Since the type of o¤-farm labour opportunities in the region is likely to drive the main di¤erences in o¤-farm earnings, using a regional dummy mitigates di¢ culties arising from a complex wage structure. Education is used as a household level proxy for o¤-farm wages 39 . In addition, the panel structure of our data allows to control for household speci…c di¤erences in labour quality that may in ‡uence o¤-farm earnings and are constant over time.
Treatment Variables
We include three treatment variables: participant in the SLCP D it ( treat), labour supplied outside of the village as opposed to within (trout), which is an interaction between the indicator outdum (a dummy variable equal to one if labour is supplied outside the village) and treat; and a regional interaction e¤ect (treatreg), because the programme's compensation di¤ers across regions. The coe¢ cients on each of these variables represent the treatment e¤ects. As discussed above, selection into SLCP is likely to be non-random. In addition to this, the decision to work outside of the village and any interaction with this is also likely to be endogenous. Identi…cation of the parameters associated with these variables is obtained using the approach described in Section 4.and Appendix B. That is, each endogenous variable is included in the projection in equation (42) in Appendix B. In terms of equation (11) for the participation dummy, D it (or treat), identi…cation requires the inclusion of D i1
(participation) and a time varying intercept, t (year) 40 . For outdum and trout identi…-cation requires the inclusion of outPRE and outPOST, which are the values of outdum in periods 0 and 1 respectively. In terms of (11) these are components of x it ; x i0 and x i1 respectively. Just as the DID approach allows any type of selection into the programme based on the household …xed e¤ect, i , endogeneity through the …xed e¤ect of outdum and trout is also accounted for using this approach.
Results
In this section we present the results of our adapted switching regression model which analyses the o¤-farm labour supply decision. The characteristics of the identi…ed constrained and unconstrained households are then discussed. Table 1 shows the results of the switching regression for the separate regimes of the o¤-farm labour market (columns 3 and 4), as well as the initial pooled regression for comparison purposes (column 2) 41 . The switching regression separates the sample into two distinct regimes. Sample separation is unobserved and hence the interpretation of the regimes can only be made by reference to the results of the component regressions in Table 1 and the 'switching' equation shown in Table 2 . Table 1 shows that the two regimes have an interpretation that is consistent with our theoretical model.
Household heterogeneity
In Regime 1 the variables that were included to re ‡ect market failures and institutional constraints, the so-called 'constraint' variables, are found to be highly signi…cant. The model predicted that only the o¤-farm labour supply of constrained households is in ‡uenced by these variables. For such constrained households, the presence of children under 16 years of age (child) and elderly household members (elderly) reduce o¤-farm labour supply, as expected. The remoteness from credit agencies (credit access) signi…cantly reduces o¤-farm labour supply. The development of the land rental market (rentease) signi…cantly increases o¤-farm labour supply, by over 127 days per year in our sample. Ease of land rental is, indeed, the most economically important constraint in the determination of o¤-farm labour supply, followed by the presence of pensioners. These …ndings are coherent with previous evidence of a strong impact of land transfers possibilities and tenure security on the development of o¤-farm labour in rural China, as well as the in ‡uence of credit constraints on production decisions of Chinese rural households (Feder et al. 1990) 42 . Conversely, in Regime 2 the only signi…cant variables are those which re ‡ect the structure of the local labour market and the household factor endowments. Indeed, only the regional dummy (regdum), the dummy indicating the destination of o¤-farm labour (outdum), land and household size are signi…cant. Importantly the constraint variables are insigni…cant. The theoretical model showed that this is a feature of o¤-farm unconstrained households. We 40 To reiterate, D i0 drops out since it is always zero. 41 In both tables, * indicates signi…cance at 10%, ** signi…cance at 5%, and *** signi…cance at 1%. Standard errors are robust.
42 See Li et al. (1998); Carter and Yao (2002) ; Deininger and Jin (2003) and Bowlus and Sicular (2003) .
thus reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous household behaviour in favour of Hypothesis 1 and conclude that households are heterogeneously exposed to the presence of market failure and institutional constraints. The separation into regimes is also seen to be robust when we compare the outcome under the two regimes to the pooled regression in column 2 of Table  1 . Many of the explanatory variables in the pooled regression are insigni…cant and yet the unobserved sample separation shows that ignoring household heterogeneity in our sample masks important behavioural di¤erences. Descriptive statistics for each of the two groups in Table B2 in Appendix C con…rm that sample separation is consistent with our hypotheses. Households that are subject to constraints supply labour o¤-farm at a shadow wage, which is lower than the market wage. Their o¤-farm labour supply should consequently be lower than that of unconstrained households. Indeed, the average o¤-farm labour supply of households belonging to the constrained group is 302 days per year, well below the average of 433 days per year for unconstrained households 43 .
The treatment e¤ect of the SLCP
Estimates of the ATT of the SLCP are contained in Tables 1 and 2 44 . In Table 1 , all three treatment e¤ects (coe¢ cients on treat; treatreg and trout) are signi…cant at the 1% level in the constrained regime, while none is signi…cant in the unconstrained regime. For the constrained households, the impact of the SLCP is large, positive and signi…cant at the 1% level, for the base group, inducing an extra 194 days per household per annum on average. This represents an increase of 56% with respect to pre-programme o¤-farm labour supply of SLCP participants. For the unconstrained regime, the treatment e¤ect is negative but not statistically signi…cant. However, for constrained households, programme participation has a negative, signi…cant and large impact on the o¤-farm labour supply of those who supply their labour outside of the village. This negative impact o¤sets the treatment e¤ect of the programme, so that the overall e¤ect of the programme on such households is not statistically di¤erent from zero. The regional treatment e¤ect (treatreg) is also signi…cant and negative, indicating that the treatment e¤ect on households in the region of Guizhou is negative. However, the overall treatment e¤ect of the programme on households in Guizhou is not statistically di¤erent from zero. For those households in Guizhou that supply their labour outside the village the treatment e¤ect is negative, but not statistically di¤erent from zero even at a 10% level.
To conclude, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of hypothesis 2: the substitution e¤ect of programme participation o¤sets the revenue e¤ect and the overall e¤ect of the SLCP is to induce participating households to reallocate their labour towards o¤-farm employment. We are also able to reject the null in favour of hypothesis 3: the impact of the programme on o¤-farm labour supply is larger for constrained than for unconstrained households. This implies that part of the e¤ect of programme participation operates through the constraints that impede household behaviour, as is further discussed in the next subsection. However, the labour reallocation which results from programme participation is realized at the village 43 A t-test shows that this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. 44 Strictly speaking this is the average treatment on the treated (Heckman et al., 1997 level, the programme having a negative impact on labour which is supplied outside the village, despite o¤-farm activities being more lucrative outside the village than within 45 . We can thus conclude that the SLCP does appear to relax local constraints that were forcing households to supply excess labour on land, but does not address, and may even sharpen, the constraints on the o¤-farm labour market itself, namely those which restrict migration outside of the locality 46 . We now turn to the nature of local constraints, and the impact of the programme upon them. Table 2 provides some indication of the nature of the constraints generating the division between households 47 . The 'switching'equation corresponds to Equation (13), indicating the impact of the explanatory variables on the probability of being in Regime 1 and therefore the probability of being constrained 48 . First of all, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of Hypothesis 4: participation in the programme signi…cantly reduces the probability of being constrained. The results suggest that in addition to participation in the SLCP, household education (education), family size (f amsize), as well as development of land transfers (rent) and better soil quality (indicating more secure tenure) reduce the probability of being constrained, as does living in the Guizhou region. Conversely, arable land endowment (land), distance to the nearest road (distroad) and to the nearest credit agency (credit dist), presence of children under 16 and elderly members of the household (child and elderly respectively) increase the probability of being in the constrained regime. The results show that there are a number of important market failures and transactions costs underpinning the constrained households.
The nature of the constraints
As seen elsewhere in China, inadequate access to credit, di¢ culties in land rental and insecure tenure are prominent market and institutional failures in the areas in question 49 . The e¤ect of the area of cultivated land (land) further points to a link between o¤-farm labour supply and the constraints imposed on households behaviour by imperfect land rights. Indeed, the rather surprising fact that more land increases the probability of being constrained (land has a positive coe¢ cient in the switcher equation) con…rms that having more land increases the burden of constraints and compels households to attach more labour to cultivation. As a consequence, the availability of labour for more lucrative o¤-farm opportunities is reduced, as illustrated by the impact of land rental rights on such constrained households' o¤-farm labour supply. Here, more developed land rights decrease the probability of being constrained, hence contributing to allow households to supply freely their labour o¤-farm and enhance the e¢ ciency of their labour allocation choices (Carter and Yao 2002) . The impact of the presence of young children or elders, which increases the probability of being 45 Our, albeit imperfect, data on wages indicates that average earnings outside the village are 50% higher than within the village. 46 Anecdotal evidence suggests that one reason for this may be that the presence of the household is required by program participation, for example because participating households have to monitor reforested areas. 47 The table reports robust standard errors. 48 Note, the coe¢ cients do not represent pure marginal e¤ects on the probability. 49 e.g. Carter and Yao (2002) , Deininger and Jin (2003) , Bowlus and Sicular (2003), Feder et al (1990 
Regime characteristics
Predictions from the 'switcher' equation yield the probability that a household belongs to a particular regime and allows us to identify constrained and unconstrained households in the sample 51 . Comparing the characteristics of constrained versus unconstrained households points to policy recommendations related to programme targeting, and allows to check that no single source of constraints determines sample separation. Con…rmation of the last point validates the use of a switching regression, one of the main advantages of which is that it does not con…ne the source of constraint to any speci…c institutional or market failure 52 . As we can see from Table B2 in Appendix C constrained households di¤er signi…cantly from unconstrained households in many respects. This indicates that no single variable drives the partition of the sample, and this con…rms our motives for using the switching regression. Constrained households supply signi…cantly less o¤-farm labour, are more likely to live in Ningxia, have a larger land endowment, exhibit lower levels of education and are further from main roads and formal credit agencies. These households are also more likely to live with young children and pensioners than unconstrained households. The institutional environment of these two groups of households also di¤ers signi…cantly. Rental rights are more likely to be prohibited and soil quality to be lower (indicating less tenure security), for those households that are identi…ed as being constrained. However, the propensity of participating in the SLCP does not signi…cantly vary across groups. This may signal that the targeting of the SLCP was inadequate, as is further discussed in the conclusion.
Conclusion
The results show that the SLCP has a heterogeneous impact on the o¤-farm labour supply of di¤erent groups of households, which face market and institutional failures of di¤erent types and intensities. When controlling for this heterogeneity, we are able to show that, in some cases, the SLCP induces participating households to reallocate a substantial amount of labour towards o¤-farm employment. Moreover, participation in the SLCP reduces households' exposure to constraints. Therefore, the empirical evidence indicates that the SLCP could induce a win-win outcome via the relaxation of constraints. Participants in the SLCP are enabled to access additional income enhancing opportunities o¤-farm and the incentives for environmentally harmful allocation choices are reduced. This optimistic result should be tempered by the fact that the SLCP is limited in the extent to which it relaxes constraints. 50 Many households in our survey cited care for the elderly as an important constraint to …nding o¤-farm labour. 51 We de…ne constrained households whose probability of being in the constrained regime is greater that the mean probability in the sample: 0.66.
52 Feder et al. (1990) use only the credit constraint as a source of behavioural di¤erence, Carter and Yao (2002) focus on the land exchange rights, Bowlus and Sicular (2003) consider only the di¤erences in land endowments or the development of the o¤-farm labour market, in exclusion of each other.
Indeed, participation in the SLCP has no statistically signi…cant impact on the supply of labour to the most lucrative o¤-farm activities, i.e. outside the village, nor is the impact particularly strong in Guizhou province.
Three main conclusions and policy implications can be derived from this analysis. Firstly, our methodology and results highlight the importance of accommodating heterogeneity in the evaluation of interventions in a context where households face idiosyncratic institutional and market failures. Applying traditional policy evaluation methods, which treat all households as a homogeneous group, would here yield erroneous policy implications. This is demonstrated in column 2 of Table 1 , which indicates that a global policy approach confounds the impact of the programme and would lead us to conclude that the impact of the SLCP on o¤-farm labour supply was insigni…cant. As a matter of fact, no previous evaluation of the SLCP has revealed any signi…cant impact of the SLCP on o¤-farm labour supply, and yet each acknowledges that the sustainability of the programme rests upon its ability to enable households to access alternative employment opportunities (Uchida et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2004) . Our study is the …rst to point to a signi…cant impact of the SLCP on households' o¤-farm labour supply decisions, albeit only on labour supplied by constrained households within the village in Ningxia.
Secondly, our analysis brings important policy recommendations with respect to programme targeting. The results imply that in order to improve the cost e¤ectiveness of the programme subsidies should target constrained households. This is a common problem for poverty alleviation programmes (Besley and Kanbur 1988) . The analysis of the characteristics of the constrained and unconstrained households, as identi…ed by the switching equation in Table B2 , leads us to conclude that the programme should focus not only on households with large land endowments, as is currently the case, but should also consider the education level, household structure and the institutional environment of recipient households. The compensation package o¤ered by the SLCP in its current design is much too uniform: it only accounts for two di¤erent levels of grain subsidy, and this distinction is made only on the basis of gross regional averages, and not at all on the basis of households characteristics. However, a more ‡exible design on the basis of household and land characteristics may give way to manipulation, either by individual households, or by local authorities. Xu et al. (2004) reveal that the simpli…ed current compensation scheme was implemented by the Central Government in part to counter rent seeking behaviour of local government that may be tempted to exploit their informational advantage by exaggerating estimates of opportunity costs so as to in ‡ate the level of subsidies. Targeting the programme on household characteristics may, thus, be complicated and costly. However, the results here indicate two potential improvements to the current situation. Firstly, policy design should embody adequate screening mechanisms to counter issues of adverse selection. For example, introducing work requirements for programme participants could induce constrained households to self select in the programme (Besley and Coate 1992) . The SLCP arranges for such requirements on tree planting and maintenance, but this clause was often misused by local authorities: ad-hoc teams were appointed which diverted programme subsidies away from SLCP participants (Xu et al. 2004 ). Secondly our analysis suggests that the objectives of the programme could be furthered and achieved more e¢ ciently, by alleviating institutional constraints on the land exchange market, on tenure security or on the credit market. These constraints remain the major impediments to labour reallocation and drive important behavioural differences between constrained and unconstrained households. The last implication of our analysis is thus that accompanying policies should focus on such constraints.
In this regard, Chinese central authorities appear to be moving in the right direction. Indeed, the National Peoples Congress announced in March 2005 that all agricultural taxes were to be removed progressively 53 . Also, the household registration system, or Hukou, will be lifted in 11 regions, which will facilitate migration to cities 54 . Concerning institutional constraints, in 2002, the National People's Congress adopted the Rural Land Contracting Law, which rea¢ rmed rural households' land use rights and their rights to transfer, exchange, and assign their land use rights to other households (Wang, Han and Bennett 2004) . Nevertheless, how these changes and reforms will a¤ect the rural poor depends greatly on the implementation will and capacity of local authorities. 
Appendices

A Household Model
The …rst order conditions of the maximization problem de…ned by (1) are:
where c and are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraints (2) and (3) respectively, and: U 1 (:) = U 1 (p; w o ; l i ; ; ; z q ; T; l o ; z c ) and U 2 (:) = U 2 (p; w o ; l i ; ; ; z q ; T; l o ; z c ) are the marginal utilities of income and leisure respectively while q 1 (:) = q 1 (l i ; ); and q 2 (:) = q 2 (l i ; ) are the marginal productivities of labour and land respectively. When neither the farm output (2) nor the land (3) constraint is binding, the …rst order conditions of utility maximization write as:
Here, the household equalizes the returns of on-and o¤-farm labour, and cultivates land until the marginal productivity of labour on that land meets the o¤-farm wage. Let us designate bŷ the productivity of the marginal land under cultivation such that the marginal productivity of on-farm labour equals the o¤-farm market wage. Using (20) and (21),^ is such that:
and
Solving (23) for l i brings a reduced form equation where l i depends only on production side characteristics and can, hence, be de…ned as separable (Singh et al. 1986 ):
Using (23), (20) and (21), we can obtain the following reduced form equation for l o :
When only the land constraint (3) is binding, the …rst order conditions of utility maximization rewrite as:
: U 1 (:)pq 2 (:) + = 0 (29)
Here, combining (27) and (28) shows that the household still equalizes the returns of onand o¤-farm labour:
In other words, separability between on farm production decisions and consumption decisions holds and the household supplies o¤-farm labour such that the marginal utility of income is equal to the marginal utility of leisure. However, the reduced form of o¤-farm labour supply becomes:
One important di¤erence compared to the …rst group of unconstrained households is that the land decision is a corner solution and o¤-farm labour supply depends on the land constraint,
Let us now consider the behaviour of households for which the farm output constraint is binding. To see how such households are also submitted to the land constraint, consider (15) to (19) . If the production constraint is binding, we have c > 0: Looking at (17), if c > 0; then must also be strictly positive for (17) to have a solution. Therefore, if the production constraint is binding, the land constraint is also binding, that is, households use all land that is available to them. When both the production and the land constraints are binding, the …rst order conditions for utility maximization can be rewritten as:
:
55 This last category of household, for which the land constraint is binding is likely to be more representative of our sample than the households for which the land constraint is not binding. On average we observe that all land is cultivated. Indeed, the average endowment of arable land of participants in the SLCP is 17.8 mu. Before the beginning of the program, on average, 17.6 mu were cultivated. This …gure drops to 6.64 mu in the current period. The di¤erence corresponds to the amount of land enrolled in the SLCP (on average, 12.44 mu). Non SLCP participants are endowed with 11.3 mu of arable land on average. The average cultivated areas before the program and in the current period are however almost identical, respectively 10.6 and 10.2 mu.
Agricultural production of the household is entirely determined by (36). Using (37) and (36) we can solve for a reduced form equation for l i expressed as a function of the constraints and the production shifters only:
From (33) and (34), we can infer that the household is neither able to equalize the returns of o¤-farm labour to the o¤-farm market wage, nor to equalize the returns of on-and o¤-farm labour. In this case the market wage for o¤-farm labour is equated to the following term:
where q 1 (:) = q 1 ( l i ; 0 ; z q ); and U 1 (:) = U 1 (p; w o ; l o ; C; T; ; 0 ; z q ; z c ): Consequently, the decision price for labour allocation becomes a shadow price, which is lower than the market wage w o : The o¤-farm labour supply of the o¤-farm constrained household is given by the reduced form equation for l o :
l o = f (p; w o ; C; T; ; 0 ; z q ; z c )
PROOF of PROPOSITION 1: Proof of Proposition 1 Participation in the SLCP imposes~ 0 > 0; so that ~ < 0 . That is, land use is reduced for SLCP participants. Given the assumption that land and labour are complements in agricultural production, labour supplied on farm decreases with land, inducing a positive substitution e¤ect from onfarm labour to o¤-farm labour. This can be seen by di¤erentiating equation (15) to obtain:
> 0: This describes the substitution e¤ect induced by land restrictions and demonstrates the …rst part of the proposition. If the subsidies exactly compensate households for their loss of agricultural income, according to (15) leisure does not vary, and the revenue e¤ect is nil. Conversely, if households are over (under) compensated we can see from (15) that there is a positive (negative) revenue e¤ect and leisure will increase (assuming normality). This describes the revenue e¤ect of participation in the SLCP and establishes the second part of the proposition. The conditions under which one e¤ect dominates the other are discussed in the text (see footnote 25).
B Empirical Model: DID Approach
56
Ignoring t for the moment, equation (10) becomes the following T variate regression model:
where T is considered …xed and: e 0 is a 1xT vector of ones; l 0 i is 1xT ; x 0 i is a 1xKT matrix of K regressors, now including D it ; 0 is a 1xK parameter vector, now including . Correlation 56 This discussion draws from Hsiao (1986, 57) and Abadie (2005, 2-5) between i and x i can be accounted for by following linear projection 57 :
Taking the expectation of (41) and inserting (42) yields:
where = I T N 0 + e 0 and is a T xKT matrix of parameters. This implies time varying coe¢ cients for x i . Using (41) and (43) gives:
where v i = l i E [l i jx i ; i ] which is orthogonal to x i by de…nition, and 0 is a 1xKT 2 vector of coe¢ cients (Hsiao 1986) 58 . Provided that the x i are time varying, the correlation between x i and i can be modelled and a consistent estimate of obtained. In particular, as is the case with more conventional panel approaches to DID, this approach allows for any type of selection into the SLCP operating through the …xed e¤ect i 59 . Adapting (10) to the case in hand is straightforward. We consider a two period model: pre-and post-programme, and de…ne t = 0; 1: Allowing intercepts to vary over time and noting that D i0 = 0 for all i; then (44) translates into the labour supply equation shown in (11).
C Description of Explanatory Variables and Regime Characteristics
57 Chamberlain (1982) was concerned with accommodating unknown error structure and formulated his model in terms of a general non-linear projection. where the indices refer to the coe¢ cent on the k th regressor at time t in the t th equation of (44). 59 That is, DID allows E [ i ; D it ] 6 = 0; hence removing this motive for estimation of the participation decision (Heckman et al. 1997 
